The European Commission has made the commitments offered by Corning legally binding under EU antitrust rules. The commitments address the Commissions competition concerns regarding Cornings alleged anticompetitive exclusive agreements for the supply of Alkali-aluminosilicate glass (Alkali-AS Glass), a special type of glass mainly used as cover glass in smartphones and other handheld electronic devices.

Preliminary Concerns of the Commission

Corning is a global glass producer for various industrial and consumer applications. It manufactures Alkali-AS Glass, a particularly break-resistant glass mainly used as a cover for displays of handheld electronic devices such as mobile phones and tablets, as well as smartwatches. Corning markets Alkali-AS Glass mainly under the Gorilla Glass brand. Alkali-AS Glass has two commercially relevant subtypes, lithium aluminosilicate glass (LAS Glass) and sodium aluminosilicate glass (NAS Glass).

On November 6, 2024, the Commission opened a formal investigation over concerns that Corning may have distorted competition in the worldwide market for Alkali-AS Glass. The Commission preliminarily found that Corning holds a dominant position in this market. It also found that products developed by Corning for Apple are not part of this market, as these have special compositions and are only used by Apple.

According to the Commissions preliminary assessment, Corning may have abused its dominant position in the market for Alkali-AS Glass in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) by entering into exclusive supply agreements with manufacturers (Original Equipment Manufacturers or OEMs) of handheld electronic devices and with companies that process raw glass (finishers) such as Alkali-AS Glass. This conduct may have excluded other Alkali-AS Glass producers from significant segments of the relevant market.

The Commitments

To address the Commissions preliminary concerns, Corning offered certain commitments. Between November 25, 2024 and January 13, 2025, the Commission tested these commitments in the market and consulted interested third parties to verify whether the commitments would alleviate its competition concerns.

In light of the outcome of this market test, Corning amended the initially proposed commitments and offered the following final commitments:

• To include both Alkali-AS Glass and transparent glass ceramics (Clear Glass Ceramics) used as cover glass in handheld electronic devices within the scope of the commitments. Clear Glass Ceramics were included because this cover material is likely to be used more extensively in the future by OEMs. However, the commitments do not apply to Cornings agreements with Apple since the Commission found that the cover glass products developed by Corning for Apple are not part of the relevant market.
• To waive all exclusive dealing clauses in all its current agreements with OEMs and finishers, and to commit not to use such or similar clauses that have the same effect in future agreements.
• In the European Economic Area (EEA): Regarding OEMs demand for Alkali-AS Glass and Clear Glass Ceramics covers for handheld electronic devices sold in the EEA, not to specifically require OEMs to purchase, or cause their supply chain to purchase, any quantity of Alkali-AS Glass or Clear Glass Ceramics from Corning and will not condition any price advantages on such sourcing requirements.
• Worldwide: Not to require OEMs to purchase, or cause their supply chain to purchase, more than 50% of their respective demand from Corning, regarding either (I) OEMs worldwide combined demand for Alkali-AS Glass and Clear Glass Ceramics covers for handheld electronic devices, and (ii) OEMs worldwide demand for either of the segments of LAS Glass or Clear Glass Ceramics covers of handheld electronic devices. Without these separate caps, Corning could target the competitively sensitive LAS Glass and Clear Glass Ceramics segments with exclusive sourcing requirements while still complying with the overall cap. Additionally, Corning will not condition price advantages on such sourcing requirements.
• Not to require finishers to purchase from Corning more than 50% of their combined worldwide demand for Alkali-AS Glass (NAS Glass, LAS Glass), and Clear Glass Ceramics covers for handheld electronic devices, nor to condition price advantages on such purchasing requirements. Moreover, Corning will not use any purchasing requirements targeting any segment (i.e., NAS Glass, LAS Glass, or Clear Glass Ceramics) of this combined worldwide demand, nor condition price advantages on such purchasing requirements. This means that finishers are free to decide how they comply with the overall cap in terms of the type and quantity of the different cover materials.
• Regarding the enforcement (in court or via arbitration) of Cornings patents related to break-resistant cover glass within the scope of the commitments, to base its claims solely on patent infringement, and not on breach of contract. Additionally, Corning will not use any other contractual mechanisms (e.g., penalties) to reinforce its patent claims.
• To include a standard anti-circumvention clause, the interpretation of which is further clarified in an interpretative note annexed to the commitments.
• To deliver a market communication to key stakeholders (OEMs and finishers) explaining the content of these commitments, in English and Mandarin Chinese.

The Commission concluded that the above final commitments would address its competition concerns regarding Cornings conduct identified in its preliminary assessment. It therefore decided to make them legally binding on Corning.

The commitments will remain in force for nine years and apply worldwide. A monitoring trustee speaking Mandarin Chinese will ensure their implementation.

Background

Article 102 of the TFEU, which can also be applied by national competition authorities, prohibits the abuse of a dominant position that may affect trade within the EU and prevent or restrict competition. The implementation of this provision is defined in Regulation No 1/2003.

Article 9(1) of Regulation 1/2003 enables companies investigated by the Commission to offer commitments in order to meet the Commissions concerns and empowers the Commission to adopt a decision to make such commitments binding on the companies. Such a decision does not reach a conclusion as to whether there is an infringement of EU antitrust rules but legally binds its addressee to respect the commitments.

Article 27(4) of Regulation 1/2003 requires that before adopting such a decision the Commission shall provide interested third parties with the opportunity to comment on the offered commitments.

If the company concerned does not honor these commitments, the Commission may impose a fine of up to 10% of its total annual turnover, without having to find an infringement of EU antitrust rules, or a periodic penalty payment of 5% per day of its daily turnover for every day of non-compliance.

More information, including the full text of the commitments, will be available on the Commissions competition website, in the public case register under the case number AT.40728.