Chairman Rinus Otte was one of the speakers at the symposium The Struggle for Supervision and Enforcement Priorities on October 14. The meeting about overseeing public interests through supervision and enforcement was organized by the Netherlands Court of Audit and the Scientific Council for Government Policy.
In his speech, Otte underscored the necessity of oversight and its contribution to a professional working environment. Otte warned against feeding the increasing manipulation thinking that underlies the eroding trust of citizens in the Public Prosecution Service and other government agencies. “The ever-expanding government oversight and its effect on public opinion is not an instrument to strengthen trust in such an angry time. It is a catalyst for more discontent and distrust in the government. Because it confirms the suspicion that the government seems to have failed again.”
The Chairman therefore advocated for supervision that is strict in norm setting, but shows a more generous understanding of everyday practice, and therefore lenient in judgment.
He concluded with the recommendation that supervisors should focus on increasing internal reflective oversight within organizations. “That is the only thing I deeply believe in.”
Contribution Rinus Otte symposium The Struggle for Enforcement and Supervision Capacity
Ladies and gentlemen,
In my career, I have come across many sensible supervision reports. However, I have never encountered a supervision report that concludes, after careful factual research, that there was perhaps a sad cause and an unfortunate combination of circumstances, and that it is also not excluded that such an unfortunate combination may occur again, but that all things considered processes, systems, safeguards, and people have worked properly. And that although the outcome is sad, there is no reason to formulate recommendations. I have never come across this. Do you know of such an example? And what does that say about oversight? In our careful criminal investigations, it regularly happens that we, or the judge, must conclude that there is a lack of lawful and convincing evidence. Given this analogy: does oversight ever acquit?
Within my own organization, oversight is stacked upon oversight, by the public prosecutor and then the judges in possibly 5 instances. And then there is the attorney general at the Supreme Court who often keeps thematic oversight on whether the Public Prosecution Service complies with the criminal procedural rules. That last part is already an expansion; previously, the PG oversaw whether the OM acted lawfully. I certainly do not want to omit the chain oversight of the Inspectorate for Justice and Security, the National Ombudsman, the Netherlands Court of Audit, and various independent investigative committees that conduct nationwide investigations in response to a serious case such as the murder of Els Borst and Bart van Us sister.
Now the OM as an example. Many forms of oversight at the OM, just like in other societal sectors. Oversight is necessary. It certainly contributes to a more professional working environment. But a concern, my concern, about the ever-expanding oversight in general, your oversight, is that this form of oversight in an angry society can lead to a strengthening of the negative image of the government organization being overseen. Oversight is not an instrument to strengthen trust in such an angry time. It is a catalyst for more discontent and distrust in the government. Because it confirms the suspicion that the government seems to have failed again. For the agency that is subjected to oversight, it is safer in such a situation not to criticize the supervisor and their reports, because then you will be even more scrutinized and disciplined. Organizations that are subjected to oversight often embrace the supervisory reports and promise improvement. The public services that have faced criticism have often become battered and fall into silent resistance. If the employees are not busy for weeks with improvements, then they are dealing with answering questions from the supervisors, the department, and parliament, making action plans, scheduling timelines, etc.
The OM can be compared to a shipping company. The headquarters sends the parks (the OM components) as ships across the world’s oceans. They receive their orders, which are stored in the captains safe before the voyage begins. During the journey, scurvy occurs, they must divert to an archipelago to stock up on fresh fruit, there is a storm that causes damage, and upon return, part of the cargo is moldy and the crew incomplete. Thus it goes in real life and work. No matter which fishing ground the national leadership of the OM sends our boats to, there is too much injustice to catch and too few resources to succeed. Choices must always be made in scarcity, and there is always setbacks.
Against this background, I have legal concerns with the manipulation and effectiveness thinking, such as with the observation:
- that there is a low chance of capture for serious offenses;
- that there is a lack of information exchange;
- that there are unclear choices in practice; and
- insufficient insight into the effectiveness of the work.
This kind of analysis feeds too much into the manipulation thinking that underlies the erosion of public trust. I do not want more public money to catch more injustice; I do not want more information exchange with the aim of further eliminating risks of crimes; I do not want more insight into effectiveness because this goal-oriented thinking heralds the birth of a criminal justice system responsible for preventing crimes, which by its nature cannot succeed unless we wish to move towards a police state.
I would rather take the daily toil in the public domain as a starting point. The public workers as a modern Sisyphus whose boulder will continually roll down. This toil can be better regarded as a constitutional perpetual motion machine with limits of legality and proportionality. Those who do not primarily think in terms of effectiveness distance themselves from thinking in risk assessments. We could think a little less about mistakes that, with hindsight, could have prevented a serious crime, not work with checklists, but contribute to a learning organization that willingly allows its work to be evaluated to evolve with the help of best practices and tips from supervisors.
One final remark. I remain unwaveringly positive about the norm setting by the legislator or by the supervisor. In the first case, there is a (memorandum or note of) explanation. It is beneficial for quality growth in oversight if the supervisor makes clear in a preamble which views underlie the assessment, rather than being dogmatic and underground. That helps the reader of the reports because there are many truths about how laws and regulations can be interpreted.
In conclusion. It helps our society further if the norm setting, if reasoned and convincing in oversight and report, is sharp and pointed. But in the judgment of the investigated practice, it would help our society and the government further if the supervisor strives for less certainty in judgment and more generous understanding of everyday practice. Strict in norm setting and lenient in judgment over the struggling practice.
My best recommendation is that you, as I also read in the documents for this symposium, strongly focus on increasing internal reflective oversight within organizations. That is the only thing I deeply believe in. Then you will become more of a guide for public organizations as a supervisor. That could be promising.
Rinus Otte